Alliances do two big things across history: they shape the balance of power before war, and they shape coalition warfare once war begins.
Deterrence is the headline. The whole logic of collective defense is to raise the expected cost for an aggressor. That’s not new—Greek leagues, Roman client systems, the 19th-century concert system—though modern alliances formalize it with treaties and standing command structures.
In war, alliances change outcomes through coordination problems (or solutions). WWII is the best case study: the Allies eventually built integrated planning (Combined Chiefs, standardized shipping priorities, unified theaters). When coalitions fail, it’s usually because of fractured command or divergent political aims—see early WWI coordination, or Axis partners pursuing different goals.
The Cold War added the “tripwire” concept: forward-deployed forces and integrated plans make deterrence credible but also make escalation more automatic. Schelling’s work on commitment and signaling matters here, as do NATO’s post-1949 efforts to standardize doctrine and create interoperability.
So yes: alliances deter, but they also change warfighting by enabling combined logistics, basing, intelligence sharing, and political legitimacy—while increasing the risk that a small crisis can pull in larger powers if commitments are ambiguous or leaders misread resolve.