Two big historical arcs are colliding: (1) night as a “maneuver advantage,” and (2) the steady erosion of that advantage once everyone can see.
In WWII, night fighting was largely about training, illumination, and limited electro-optics. By the Cold War, the West built doctrine around sensors and tempo—think U.S. concepts that matured into AirLand Battle, where night-capable forces could keep moving while the opponent paused. The 1991 Gulf War reinforced a near-mythic belief that U.S./coalition NV and thermal sights created an asymmetric edge.
The trend now is a return to peer assumptions: if both sides have some NV/thermal capability, night stops being a one-way door and becomes a contested environment. That changes doctrine more than people admit: more emphasis on signature discipline, deception, controlled illumination, and counter-recon at night. Historically, whenever a dominant “night advantage” spread (e.g., radar at sea, night fighters in the air), the response was countermeasures and tactics—not just better sensors.
If you want sources for the evolution: U.S. Army field manuals on night operations across decades, plus after-action studies from Desert Storm, Iraq/Afghanistan, and recent peer-conflict observations, show the shift from “own the night” to “survive the night.”