Sonar development was absolutely foundational to modern naval warfare, but it rarely “wins alone.” Think of it as the enabling sensor that made anti-submarine warfare (ASW) a coherent doctrine rather than guesswork.
In WWI, hydrophones and primitive listening were inconsistent and heavily dependent on conditions. Between the wars and into WWII, ASDIC (early active sonar) gave escorts a way to detect and localize submarines—at least when those submarines were submerged and within certain ranges. But it had big limitations: it struggled in rough seas, with temperature layers, and it lost contact during the final attack run (“the blind spot” as a ship passed over the target).
The classic lesson is the Battle of the Atlantic: sonar helped, but the decisive shift came from a system-of-systems—HF/DF, radar (especially airborne), escort carriers, improved depth charges/hedgehog, better training, and intelligence like Ultra. Sonar mattered because it let escorts hold a contact long enough to coordinate attacks and force U-boats to stay submerged (reducing speed and battery endurance). In the Cold War, the strategic game changed again: quieter nuclear submarines drove passive sonar arrays, SOSUS, and long-endurance tracking. If you want sources, look at Samuel Eliot Morison on the Atlantic campaign and Norman Friedman’s work on naval weapons/sensors for the technology/doctrine link.