If you look at the arc of military campaigning, “sleep tech” is really a logistics story. Roman legionaries carried a cloak and relied on routine, fire discipline, and shelter; Napoleonic armies often slept in the open with minimal bedding; the US Civil War saw blankets and oilcloth, but wet-cold misery was constant in letters and diaries.
By WWII you start seeing mass-standardized sleeping bags, but they were still heavy, cotton-wrapped, and slow to dry. The Korean War is where cold-weather failures forced institutional learning—better insulation, better layering doctrine, and more emphasis on keeping insulation dry (a theme repeated in Vietnam’s wet conditions).
Modern improvements are less “magic warmth” and more: lighter insulations that retain loft, better shells that resist wind and moisture, and modular systems that match doctrine (layering, mission profiles, transport constraints). The biggest change is that armies now treat sleep as an operational enabler, not a comfort item—because fatigue ruins decision-making. For sources, it’s worth reading soldier accounts (e.g., S.L.A. Marshall’s interviews and various unit after-action notes) alongside modern field manuals that explicitly tie rest to performance.